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I.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the Hecla's 1 response brief hinges on a single argument: that the
mere invocation of "I did not mean to hurt that employee" is a panacea for all
occupational-injury claims, no matter how egregious an employer's conduct.
However, caselaw and the facts of this action brought by the Mareks 2 demonstrate
otherwise, as discussed below.
In summary, the two Idaho decisions relied upon by Hecla - Kearney 3 and
DeMoss 4

-

simply reflect that the exclusivity-exception to Idaho's workers'

compensation laws (LC. §72-209(3)) does not apply to negligent conduct. However,
Justice

Huntley's prescient concurrence in Kearney

(citing,

in part, the

Restatement) foreshadowed that dangerous conduct beyond mere negligence would
invoke the exclusivity-exception.
The Dominguez case5 reflected just such a scenario foreseen by Justice
Huntley: the "knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working
environment" - that is, conduct beyond mere negligence.

Hecla complains that

Dominguez was decided by default, but even defaults must be predicated on valid

1

In this brief, "Hecla," collectively, is defendants-respondents Hecla Limited, Hecla
Mining Company, Silver Hunter Mining Company, Phillip S. Baker, Jr., John
Jordan, Doug Bayer, Scott Hogamier, Cindy Moore, and Dale Stepro.
2 In this brief, "the Mareks" are plaintiffs-appellants Patricia Marek, Michael
Marek, Jodie Marek, and Hayley Marek.

3

Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755, 760 P.2d 1171 (1988).

4

DeMoss v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 (1990).

5 Dominguez v. Evergreen Resources, 142 Idaho 7, 121 P.3d 938 (2005).
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legal theories. Further, the facts presented by the Mareks amply demonstrate that
the danger created by Hecla squarely fits within the scope of conduct that allows
the exclusivity-exception to apply.

This is further borne out by the admissible

findings of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA"). The
counter-facts offered by Hecla in its response are otherwise incomplete and/or
in~ccurate, and, at a minimum, represent disputed facts, precluding summary
judgment in Heda's favor.
The Mareks' case does not, as Hecla suggest, break any new ground, or lead
employers/employees into some undiscovered country ripe for litigation chaos. The
District of Idaho - as recently as three weeks ago - issued a decision in a factually
similar case, denying an employer's motion to dismiss asserting workers'
compensation exclusivity. Braase v. Battelle Energy All., LLC, No. 4:14-CV-00481EJL, 2016 WL 676358 (D. Idaho Feb. 18, 2016)(J. Lodge).
Further, West Virginia

another state with mining as a key industry -

previously rejected the kind of 'specific intent' argument advanced by Hecla,
allowing for 'Mandolidis actions.'

Those actions allowed suits like the Mareks'

action, and were premised on the fundamental principle that workers' compensation
was designed to preclude litigation on negligent conduct only.
Here, the District Court's overly narrow reading of Kearney and DeMoss is in
error, as Idaho's workers' compensation scheme is not an invitation for employers to
place employees in deathtraps with impunity.

Instead, the Legislature built a

figurative escape hatch in the workers' compensation laws for employees whose

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 4

employers failed to provide a literal one - the exclusivity-exception.
The Mareks' action appropriately fits within that exclusivity-exception, as
discussed below, and the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to
Hecla should be reversed.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The new Braase decision in the District of Idaho.
During the pendency of the briefing of this appeal, the District of Idaho

issued a decision in Braase v. Battelle Energy All., LLC, 2016 WL 676358,
examining the workers' compensation exclusivity-exception for willful aggression.
The U.S. District Court's ruling tracks the Mareks' arguments in this appeal, and
pr<)Vide further support for the Mareks' position on appeal.
In Braase, an employee of Battelle Energy Alliance (Battelle) at the INL,
"was exposed to radioactive dust while repackaging radioactive fuel plates during
the course of his employment." Id. at *l.

The employee's claims were brought

under the Price-Anderson Act and Idaho state laws. Id. Battelle moved to dismiss
the action, asserting that the employee's claims fell under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act. Id.
The U.S. District Court denied the motion, finding that the "Complaint has,
at-least at this stage, alleged facts which may give rise to the application of the
exception to exclusivity rule of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act." Id. at *4.
Most relevant to this appeal is how the U.S. District Court reached that decision.
As Hecla does in this action, Battelle argued that Kearney and DeMoss were
dispositive of the issue: "Battelle relies upon the decisions in Kearney and DeMoss
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 5

in_ support of its argument that the Complaint fails to allege it acted with the
requisite specific intent to cause injury to Mr. Braase; i.e., that the Complaint's
allegations of negligent conduct are insufficient to raise claims exempted from the
exclusivity of the worker's compensation laws." Id. at *2.
In turn, like the l\1areks, the employee argued that Dominguez was
instructive on the application of the exclusivity-exception to conduct beyond mere
negligence:
Mr. Braase likens this case to Dominguez, arguing the facts alleged in
the Complaint show Battelle's wilful and unprovoked physical
aggression based on intentional conduct, not mere negligence. (Dkt. 13
at 11-16.) In particular, Mr. Braase points to the allegations that the
Battelle supervisors directed work to proceed despite knowing of the
danger of an airborne release of radioactive material and the workers'
questioning of whether the repackaging process should proceed.
Additionally, the Complaint alleges Battelle failed to warn its
employees of the known risks and danger of exposure and/or provide
protective equipment or proper safety procedures. These allegations,
Mr. Braase argues, demonstrate the wilful and unprovoked physical
aggression necessary for the exemption to apply. Battelle maintains
that these allegations sound in negligence and do not show the
requisite intentional actions needed to fall within the exclusion to the
exclusivity rule of the worker's compensation law.

Id. The U.S. District Court then held that the employee had appropriately pled a
"wilful or unprovoked physical aggression of Battelle":
These allegations go to show Battelle knew of the risks and dangers of
encountering the failed fuel plates when it ordered Mr. Braase to
repackage and/or continue the repackaging process, failed to warn Mr.
Braase of the dangers, failed to follow federal safety regulations, and
intentionally and knowingly exposed Mr. Braase to radioactive
particles. (Dkt. 1 at ir,r 12-15, 20, 23, 25-26, 67-69.) If true, such
allegations may establish that l\lfr. Braase's injuries were caused by
the willful or unprovoked physical aggression of Battelle.

Id. at *3. In doing so, the Court illustrated some of the distinction between the
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 6

matter as pled and the Kearney and DeMoss decision:
The allegations that Battelle knew of and concealed the danger and/or
risk of exposure distinguishes this case from DeMoss where the
employer did not have actual knowledge that the material was
asbestos at the time the employees were directed to remove the
material. See DeMoss, 795 P.2d at 877-78. The Kearney case is also
somewhat different because the danger in that case was known to both
the employee and employer.Kearn ey, 760 P.2d at 1172. The facts
alleged in this case are closer to the facts in Dominguez where the
danger was known to the employer but unknown to the employees. The
Complaint here alleges Battelle instructed Mr. Braase to continue the
repackaging process, even after the employees expressed safety
concerns, knowing of and concealing the dangers in doing so. Whether
Mr. Braase can ultimately prove Battelle's conduct was wilful and
unprovoked physical aggression remains to be seen. On this Motion,
the Court's obligation is to examine the allegations made in the
Complaint and determine whether they are sufficient at this early
stage to raise claims over which this Court may have subject matter
jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Complaint
here has done so.

Id. (emphasis added).
The record in this appeal likewise reveals that Hecla persisted in
undermining the pillar in the ill-fated area despite fellow employees having
expressed their concerns for the safety of that course of action. This well-reasoned
decision further demonstrates the appropriateness of the Mareks' arguments in
ad:vancing their claims.

B.

Kearney and DeMoss do not dictate the result in this matter.
l.

Kearney and DeMoss deny the exclusivity-ex ception to
negligent conduct, but not to conduct beyond mere negligence.

Heda's argument that workers' compensation exclusivity applies in this
matter is essentially predicated on the position that the older Kearney and DeMoss
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decisions are solely determinative of this matter. In short, the thrust of Hecla's
argument is that the exclusivity exception only applies where there is an "intent to
injure." (Respondents' Brief at 12.) However, this position, critically, avoids Justice
Huntley's instructive foreshadowing in his Kearney concurrence, and this Court's
more recent Dominguez decision.
While both parties have extensively briefed Kearney, Justice Huntley's
concurrence, in its entirety, bears reiteration:
I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be
instances where an employer's knowing ordering of an
employee into an unsafe working environment would, in my
judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression ..
The issue is whether conduct which lacks a specific intent to injure can
properly be termed intentional under the terms of LC. § 72-209(3). As
noted by the Court in Jones v. VIP Development, 472 N.E.2d 1046
(Ohio 1984),
[A]n intentional tort is an act committed with the intent to
injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is
substantially certain to occur. See 1 Restatement of the Law
2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A. We hereby reject the
proposition that a specific intent to injure is necessary to a
finding of intentional misconduct. (Emphasis added.)
1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A reads:
The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this
Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.
In the instant case there is no evidence to demonstrate that the
employer knew the employee would operate the machine without the
grass catcher affixed, which installation would have covered the
opening in the chassis \vhich exposed the blade.
Kearney, 114 Idaho at 758 (emphasis added).
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In short, Justice Huntley's

.

concurrence expressly contemplated a scenario where knowingly sending an
employee into a hazardous area went beyond the mere kinds of "accidents"
contemplated by the workers' compensation scheme.
Moreover, Justice Huntley's concurrence 1s based on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and did not come from some fantastical source.

In fact, the

particular section (8A) was also favorably utilized by the Court of Appeals in a later
decision:
The tort of battery requires intentional bodily contact which is either
harmful or offensive. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238
(1986) (citing RESTATEMEN T (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965)).
The intent element of the tort of battery does not require a desire or
purpose to bring about a specific result or injury; it is satisfied if the
actor's affirmative act causes an intended contact which is
unpermitted and which is harmful or offensive. See Rajspic v. National
Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 729, 718 P.2d 1167 (1986);
RESTATEMEN T (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 16, 18 and 20 (1965).
Indeed, the contact and its result may be physically harmless. Thus, a
person may commit a battery when intending only a joke, or a
compliment-wh ere an unappreciated kiss is bestowed without consent,
or a misguided effort is made to render assistance. PROSSER &
KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS§§ 8, 9 (5th ed. 1984).
White v. Univ. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 564, 565, 768 P.2d 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1989) aff'd,
.

118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108 (1990). Further, the Restatement (Second) of Torts has
been utilized on many occasions by this Court, including in a decision issued just a
couple of weeks before the filing of this reply brief. Alexander v. Stibal, No. 41604,
2016 WL 758000, at *7 (Idaho Feb. 26, 20l6)(quoting discussion of Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Section 544, in Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Servs., Inc., 147 Idaho 378,
210 P.3d 63 (2009)).
Simply stated, Kearney and DeMoss rejected application of the exclusivity
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exclusion as applied to negligent conduct by an employer. Kearney, 114 Idaho at
757 ("It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent
acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur.")(emphasis added);
DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179 ("To reiterate what we said in Kearney v. Denker, 'It is
not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts th.at
m~de it substantially certain that injury would occur."')(emphasis added). Where
the door remained open, however, was egregious, endangering conduct by an
employer that went into that realm of conduct beyond bare negligence.

It was

precisely that area of the law that Justice Huntley spoke to in concurring in the
Kearney result, saying, in effect, 'this result is correct, but here is the kind of
conduct, beyond negligence, that will trigger the exception to the exclusion.'
Dominguez brought that issue to the forefront in Idaho. Where Dominguez
departs from Kearney and DeMoss is that the conduct by the employer went over
and above simple negligence, and did not hinge on question of "intent to injure" a
specific employee, or any "ill will" towards Scott Dominguez or any of the other
employees involved. Instead, the question strictly hinged on the hazardous nature
of the situation created by the employer, as there is nothing in any of the
Dominguez cases that suggest the employer had any kind of specific intent to injure
Mr. Dominguez. Even for Mr. Elias' criminal conviction, no such specific intent was
required. See United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1018 (9th Cir.), as modified
(Dec. 21, 2001), supplemented. 27 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2001)(rejecting Elias'
objection to jury instruction that provided that, to convict Mr. Elias, "[t]he

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 10

government does not need to show that the defendant actually intended to harm or
endanger any person.").

The District Court here appeared to recognize this

principle in the Dominguez cases, and how it differed from the Kearney and DeMoss
matters. (Corrected Record ("C.R.") 970, discussing Dominguez: "In the case at bar,
there are no allegations that Defendants acted with any subjective intent to harm
Pete and/or Mike Marek, nor are there any allegations that Defendants believed
that harm was substantially certain to occur.")(emphasis added).
By way of aside, Hecla argues that the nature of the default judgment 1n
Dominguez reflected a refusal by the Court to "review the merits of the plaintiffs
claim," and, as such, "did not even purport to say anything about whether the facts
alleged there satisfied the exception to the Exclusivity Rule[.]" (Respondents' Brief,
at ·22.) More correctly, the Dominguez Court refused to review "the district court's
denial of [employer's] summary judgment motion concerning Dominguez's factual
claim." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 13 (emphasis added). It refused to do so given the
usual prohibition of reviewing denials of summary judgment motions.

Id.

It

otherwise refused to review the default judgment because the employer never
moved for relief. Id.
Here, the discussion of the challenge was in the context of a summary
judgment motion made against Dominguez' "factual claim." Defaults decide factual
matters, and in Dominguez, the Court simply held that challenges to Dominguez'
factual claim was unavailable. The viability of a legal claim
exception in light of those facts
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under the exclusivity-

was validated by the Court. Id., 11-12 (discussing

exclusion and exception thereto). Again, defaults determine factual matters;
theories must still be valid. Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 37, 720 P.2d 21 7,
220 (Ct. App. 1986) (cited in Dominguez)("O n appeal, a defaulted defendant may not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a default judgment, he may only contest
the sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations to support the judgment.");
Johnson v. State, 112 Idaho 1112, 1114-1115, 739 P.3d 411, 413-414 (Ct. App. 1987)
("[T]he court may consider the merits of the underlying cause of action in
determining whether entry of default is appropriate."); accord, generally, lOA
Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2688 (3d ed.) ("Even after default,
-

however, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts
constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit mere
conclusions of law."). Here, the Mareks' claims echo those of Dominguez and, in
light of the evidence presented (which, even at a minimum, the District Court
recognized as "disputed facts" (C.R. 973)), entitle the Mareks to summary judgment
and/or denial of Heda's motion for summary judgment.
Finally, Hecla also makes passing argument that references to "reckless"
conduct help it escape liability. (Respondents' Brief at 2, 3, 12, & 34; compare with
C.R. 408, 410 (MSHA citations) & R. Adden. 19 (MSHA Decision).) What Hecla fails
to recognize, however, that under Idaho law, "reckless" conduct goes well beyond
bare negligence, as recently discussed by this Court:
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important
particulars. It differs from that form of negligence which consists in
mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to take
precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or
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probable future emergency in that reckless misconduct requires a
conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the
serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which
would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only
from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that
negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge
that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless
must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in
amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 751, 274 P.3d 1256, 1266 (20l2)(quoting
State v. Papse, 83 Idaho 358, 362-63, 362 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1961)). Thus, Heda's
argument on this point fails.
Accordingly, reversal of the District Court's decision is appropriate, as, in
light of the facts applicable in this matter, this case echoes the kind of conduct
present in the Dominguez case such as to apply the exclusivity-exception.

2.

Certain facts proffered by Hecla are inaccurate and/or incomplete.

In addressing the primary cases and facts at issue in this matter, Hecla also
offers brief factual arguments in an effort to avoid reversal, primarily by attempting
to weave a tale of good conduct by Heda's actors, and place blame on the Mareks.
These efforts cannot change the facts of this case, or otherwise mask Heda's
culpable conduct.
a.

Bayer's visit to the stope days before the collapse.

Hecla attempts to argue that had Mr. Bayer (the Mine Superintendent)
known that the stope was unsafe, he would not have visited it on April 13, two days
before the rockfall that killed Pete Marek. (Respondents' Brief at 11, n.8.) It is true
that Mr. Bayer visited the stope on April 13, along with other Hecla employees (Mr.
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DeVoe, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Lund) as part of a weekly geology tour. (C.R. 777.)
_ However, what Hecla's argument omits is what transpired then, and
afterwards:
•

At the April 13 geology tour, Mr. Bayer observed that the stope was overwide.
(C.R. 777 .) In particular, the stope was, in places, 24 feet in width, well in
excess of the 20-foot maximum width.6 (C.R. 733, 11. 75:12-76:22.)

•

At the April 13 geology tour, Mr. Ruff, the production geologist who raised
multiple warnings with Mr. Bayer, Mr. Cox, Mr. DeVoe, Mr. Lund, and
others,7 advised Mr. De Voe to re-start the pillar "right away." (C.R. 681, 11.
120:23-121:15.)

•

Subsequent blasting in the stope occurred on April 14. (C.R. 671, 11. 80:1981:10; 527.)
These facts actually demonstrate the absence of the Mine Superintendent,

Mr. Bayer, from the hazardous area in the time immediately preceding the roof
collapse, after observing an overwide stope, after receiving a recommendation to restart a pillar, and after additional blasting.

These facts, coupled with other

warnings received in advance of the roof collapse, s might readily be construed by a
jury to demonstrate that Mr. Bayer (and others) avoiding the area of danger, while
6 Although unclear as to the date, miner Dan McGillis also testified that, in this
approximate timeframe, he advised Doug Bayer to split the stope in light of the
width, and was rebuffed. (C.R. 602-603, 11. 132:4-135:3.)
C.R. 242-243, 11. 151:15-152:24; 244-245, 11. 153:6-155:4; and 402-407.
s E.g., dribbling, which "indicates that the ground is weakening and there's a good
possibility of a cave-in," which Dan McGillis testified he warned Doug Bayer about.
(C.R. 572, 11. 13:5-14:24.)
7
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directing others to work in it, much like Mr. Elias in Dominguez, who avoided
spraying out the cyanide tank himself.
b.

The overlength of the pillar removal at issue.

In response to the Mareks' argument that "the extent of the pillar removal in
the 6150-15 stope was greater than had ever been done before in the mine," Hecla
contends in a footnote that "both witnesses testified such a length had been done
successfully in the past." (Compare Appellants Mareks' Brief-in-Chief at 30 with
Respondents' Brief at 5-6, n.6.)

In doing so, Hecla simply re-cites the same

deposition testimony cited by the Mareks, and cites no other portion of the record in
support of this contention. (Id.) Lest there be further confusion on this point, here
is additional testimony from defendant Doug Bayer:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Q So I want you to tell me everywhere in the mine
that had in the underhand cut and fill method undercut a
waste pillar to a distance of more than 70 feet from
side -- completely exposing it from side to side.
Do you understand my question?
A More than 70 feet?
Q Yes.
A I'm not aware of more than 70 feet. Other than
15 stope Cut 3. 15 stope Cut 2 excavated 30 feet of the
pillar on the west side. 12 stope Cut -- 6100 Cut 1
excavated about 56 feet, the pillar.

(C.R. 499, 11. 22:3-13.)(emphasis added). 9
Thus, as Hecla has failed to identify any other facts in the record to the
contrary, this fact remains undisputed.
The undercut at issue undermined the rock pillar for a distance of approximately
7 4 feet, leaving it in the roof of the stope with cement fill on either side of it. (C.R.
408; C.R. 497, 11. 15:1-16:1; C.R. 718, 11. 15:10-13).
9
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c.

The proposed substitution of Bayer and Jordan as "engineers" in
lieu of the actual Chief Engineer.

Hecla also attempts to tout the mine engineering experience of Mr. Bayer and
Mr. Jordan, attempting to substitute their "reviews" of the mining plan for that of
the actual Chief Mining Engineer, Mr. Krusemark.

(Respondents' Brief at 5.)

Setting aside obvious questions of engineering competency in light of the MSHA
mandatory standard violations, MSHA sanctions, and the death/injury suffered by
miners in this case, at the time of the collapse, it was Mr. Krusemark - not Mr.
Bayer or Mr. Jordan - who was the Chief Engineer for the mine.IO As previously
noted, the pillar removal plan was not shown to Mr. Krusemark until after the
collapse - his immediate reaction, upon observing the plans calling for removal of
the pillar, was ''You gotta be fucking kidding me."

(C.R. 534, 11. 18:1-

16)(emphasis added). Mr. Krusemark also indicated that the mine plan calling for
the pillar removal would not have been approved without a tested, designed,
engineered ground support plan. (C.R. 535, 11. 24:24-25:16). Thus, Heda's efforts to
remedy the lack of Chief Engineer review and approval of the disastrous pillarremoval plan, by contending that Mr. Bayer and Mr. Jordan's "reviews" were
10

Mr. Bayer also admitted he was not a rock mechanics expert:
66
21
Q I believe you testified that you don't consider
22 yourself a rock mechanics expert; is that correct?
23
A An expert, no.

(C.R. 510, 11. 66:21-23.) Recall, also, that Hecla did not have a full-time rock
mechanics engineer until after the collapse, and no outside consultant was utilized
to evaluate the pillar removal. (C.R. 511, 11. 72:6-21; 451, 11. 39:12-40:23; 659; 11.
32:25-33:2; 693, 11. 14:14-15:5; & 725, 11. 43:13-18.
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sufficient, can be safely disregarded by the Court.
d.

The renewed effort to blame Pete and Mike Marek for working
where they were assigned to work.

Appallingly, Hecla continues to blame Pete and Mike for Pete's death and
Mike's injuries, desperate to avoid any responsibility for the rockfall for which
MSHA has already severely sanctioned Hecla.

(Respondents' Brief, at 14:

"Defendants did not send the Mareks to the location where the accident occurred;
the Mareks chose to go there on their own.").
This argument has already been extensively rebutted by testimony presented
by a number of witnesses, including defendants Doug Bayer and Dale Stepro:

Mike Marek:
21
Q. On the morning you were recounting the evening
22 of the accident, sir, and did you talk with your shift
23 boss before you went underground?
24
A. Yes.
25
Q. And did you get any directions from him as to
1 what you were to do?
2
A. He said -- I asked him "What do you want us to
3 do if we're muck bound?" And at first he just kind of
4 went like this with his arm.
5
Q. Let the record show that you're
6
A. Yeah, like, "Well, I don't know." Then he
7 goes, "Well, you can work on the spray chamber.
8
Q. And did you, Larry, ever go to spray chamber
9 that evening?
10
A. No, but we were going to.
11
Q. Sure. The decision was made to wet the muck.
12 Larry suggested you wet the muck, correct?
13
A. Correct.
14
Q. And was the reason you went to wet the muck
15 because you thought you would be able to move it during
16 that shift sometime?
17
A. Sure. Because sometimes we can load trucks,
18 like I said, and I did see a truck at my stope.
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(C.R. 884-885, 11. 309:21-310:18.)
Doug Bayer:
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q And it's typical in the stopes after the blasts
when there's muck in the stopes, it's typical to water
the muck down, isn't it? To wet it down?
A Yes.
Q \Vhy is that done?
A Mainly, control dust. It's very dusty after a
blast.
Q And that's something you don't have to
specifically tell your miners? They know to do that?
A They know to do that.
Q Are you critical of Pete Marek for having
watered down the muck in his stope?
A I'm not critical of that. No.
78

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q Are you critical of Pete Marek in any respect?
A No.
Q Same question with regard to Mike Marek. Are
you critical of him for having wet down the muck in his
stope?
A No.
Q Are you critical of him in any respect for the
events of April 15th, '11?
A No. I don't believe either miner did anything
wrong as to being in the - in the stope or whatnot.
They have the freedom to plan their day. So
this particular day that they were muck bound and they
were given maintenance type jobs to do, maintain or fix
something, repair something.
So there's no set rule that a miner has to go
wet down if he's not going to work his stope. He can.
It's not uncommon. But they don't have to. They -Q But you wouldn't have disciplined them or
chastised them if you learned that that's what they did?
A No.
Q And if they were muck bound, but if they
anticipated that some of the muck would be moved, they
would want to minimize the dust if they could?
A Yeah. It's kind of rare to -- trucks to show
up, because normally the shifter has a plan and he lines
79
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12

out the muck crew, go here, here, here. And there's a
lot of muck to move. So they don't normally just drive
around and say, "I'm going to show up unannounced."
Usually there's a plan on where they go. I wouldn't say
that was -- I just can't see that being a motivator to
wet down. But like I say, it's not uncommon.
A miner will usually want to inspect the
workplace, look for hazards, wet down, look to see if
there's a mishole. He might be able to shoot a mishole
on shift so the next shift doesn't have to, so the
hazard's taken care of, that kind of thing. That's all
part of the mining process.

(C.R. 512-513, 11. 77:13-79:12)(emphases added).

Dale Stepro:

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

34
Q.
Okay. So on this particular shift, the
Mareks weren't working out of position. Correct?
MR. RAMSDEN: Object. Calls for a conclusion.
You can go ahead and answer.
THE WITNESS: They -- no, I -- I assigned them to
do the spray chamber and everything, and I didn't even
think about them going in there and looking at the muck
pile. You know, that's -- you gotta figure miners are a
whole different breed. Okay? And yeah, I didn't even
think about them going in there and looking at the muck
piles. Very true.
BYMR. NICKELS:
Q.
Was it unusual that they went in and hosed
down the muck pile?
A.
Probably not.
Q.
Would that be part of a routine shift for
the Mareks if they completed their other assigned tasks?
MR. RAMSDEN: Object. Foundation. Go ahead. Go
ahead and answer the questions.
THE WITNESS: I would imagine, yes, going in to
look things over.
BYMR. NICKELS:
Q.
And at no point on that shift did you tell
them not to hose down the muck pile?
A.
No, I didn't tell them that.
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

36
Q.
And what I wanted to in particular ask is:
The second column of that letter, which is on the first
page -- and I'll just read it so we're on the same page
as to which one I'm talking about. It's the paragraph
that reads, "Every miner knows that it is common
protocol to wet down and access the blast on the next
shift, even if you are not assigned to work that
37
heading. Larry and Mark did what every miner always
does and what has always been accepted by the company as
standard operating procedures." Do you agree with that
statement?
MR. RAMSDEN: Object. Calls for a legal
conclusion. Go ahead and answer.
THE WITNESS: When I was a miner, I did the same
thing. I went in and wet down the muck pile.
BYMR. NICKELS:
Q.
So there's nothing in that particular
statement from Mr. Norman that you disagree with?
A.
No.

(C.R. 636, 11. 34:1-25 & 36:19-37:12)(emphases added).

George Houchin (miner):

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

23
Q.
And what I wanted to ask you about on this
exhibit is one particular paragraph in this letter from
Mr. Norman, and it's this paragraph in the second column
which says, "Every miner knows that it is common
protocol to wet down and access the blast on the next
shift even if you are not assigned to work that heading.
Larry and Mike did what every miner always does and what
has always been accepted by the company as standard
operating procedures." Do you have any disagreement
with that paragraph?
A.
Not one.

(C.R. 618, 11. 23:8-18.)11

J:'he letter referred to is a letter to the editor submitted by a Lucky Friday Mine
miner, Rick Norman. (C.R. 64 7-649.)
11
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Dan McGillis ("Sugar Daddy" miner):
98
5
Q So if you're muck bound, what do you do?
6
A What would I do?
7
Q Yeah.
8
A I would go in, I would wet my muck pile down, I
9 would hang my wire, is what I would do.

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

155
Q And when you went into a stope to do your work,
you've told us earlier that you would muck out the area
if there was muck there; correct?
A Yes.
Q You didn't have to be told specifically by your
shifter to muck out, did you?
A No.
Q You knew to do that.
A Yes.
Q And you would wet the muck down?
A Yes.
Q And again, you didn't have to be told
specifically to do that?
A No.
MR. RAMSDEN: Object as leading.
MR. HAVAS: Q You knew to do that?
A Yes.
MR. RAMSDEN: Object as leading.
MR. HAVAS: Q Would you wet down the muck even if
you were muck bound?
A Yes.
Q Why?
A I would wet down the muck and hang my wire if I
was muck bound. The reason being is that yes, I am muck

156
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

bound, but at any time they could come down to start
mucking me out to where I could start mucking, and I
would be prepared to do that at that time.
Q Do you understand that Larry and Mike Marek on
the 15th of April 2011 wet down their muck piles?
A Yes, I understand they did.
Q Even though they were muck bound?
A Yes.
Q Did that strike you as out of the ordinary or
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10 unusual?
11
A No.
(C.R. 594, 11. 98:5-9 and 608, 11.155:2-156:11.)
Even on reconsideration, the District Court ultimately agreed that the
Mareks were working where they should have been:

With regard to the argument by the plaintiffs that the general
duty assignment to that stope was sufficient to constitute an
authorization that they be in there watering the muck, I think
that's true, but that's not the test. As Mr. Ramsden points out, was
there express direction to go in there which amounted to willful or
unprovoked physical aggression?
(2nd Tr., 11. 26:13-19)(emphasis added).
At the barest of minimums, Heda's efforts to dispute this point illustrate at
least some disputed fact regarding "an employer's knowing ordering of an employee
into an unsafe working environment" (per Justice Huntley) such as should have
precluded the granting of summary judgment in Heda's favor.

C.

The genesis and application of Mandolidis actions in West Virginia
are more instructive to this Court than a broader, more ill-defined
multi-state survey.
Hecla notes that a majority of states require an 'intent to injure,' calling it an

"almost unanimous rule." (Respondents' Brief at 14)(emphasis in original).

12

12

Hecla

There actually appears to be several states that deviate from the majority rule:
Indeed, constructive intent has been said to be an acceptable
substitute for actual intent even in cases where the intentional-tort
exception is worded in terms of 'willful' injury or 'deliberate intention'
to inflict injury. In jurisdictions following this view, the courts
generally have adopted the broad Restatement definition of intent,
which states that intent denotes that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it. . . . n.66. To date, courts in
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argues that, in light of Kearney and DeMoss, Idaho simply follows what the
m~jority of other states do. Hecla goes on to make discussion of exemplar decisions
from other states favorable to its position.

It is problematic, however, to rely upon what amounts to a 50-state survey in
the context of workers' compensation. Unlike "uniform" laws such as, e.g., the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Probate Code, workers' compensation
laws developed in their home states, under their own statutory language and
caselaw. The language of the statute at issue in Idaho, for example - "in any case
where the injury or death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer" - is not replicated verbatim in any other state.
What happens in other states' 'laboratories of democracy' provides no
universal rule.13 What it does provide, however, are examples of different historical
treatments of workers' compensation law, and the key legal and public policy
considerations underlying those laws and exceptions thereto.
A good example, analogous to this case, is West Virginia.

Prior to more

recent statutory amendments (discussed below), West Virginia's exclusivity-

Louisiana, Ohio, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
and Texas have recognized this view. In West Virginia, judicial
precedent in this regard has been modified by statute.
48 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1 (originally published in 1987).
13 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S. Ct. 371, 386-87, 76 L. Ed.
7 47 (1932)("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.")(Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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exception stated very rigid language, much akin to what Hecla advocates here:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate
intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the
employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee
shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have
cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been
enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or
receivable under this chapter.

1913 W.Va.Acts, ch. 10 s 28 (as cited in Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W.
Va. 695, 698 n.2, 246 S.E.2d 907, 910 n.2 (1978))(emphasis added). In Mandolidis,
the West Virginia Supreme Court evaluated three occupational injury cases, all
dismissed for failing to meet the exclusivity-exception. 246 S.E.2d at 909-910.
The Mandolidis court gave thought to the history and purpose underlying the
workers' compensation scheme as a whole, offering:
What was the intention of the original section? The answer to this
specific question can best be answered by recalling the purpose for the
enactment of workmen's compensation legislation in the first instance.
The paramount reason for such legislation was, of course, that under
the common law tort system workers injured in industrial accidents
recovered compensatory damages in a rather small percentage of cases.
The Workmen's Compensation Act was designed to remove
[n]egligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort
system.
246 S.E.2d at 910-11 (emphasis added). The Mandolidis court found that an overly
strict reading of the exclusivity-exception created a result that ultimately undercut
the core reason that workers' compensation laws were created:
We are of the opinion that reading the language of the provision under
review here to mean the same thing as similar wording in a criminal
statute defining murder is contrary to the basic rules governing the
construction of workmen's compensation statutes. There is no
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adequate justification for adhering to the construction of a statute
which is not only erroneous but which works an injustice on persons
injured as a result of conduct which is so likely to produce injury or
death that its performance, under all circumstances, could perhaps
warrant criminal liability. No person or organization of persons should
be permitted to escape full responsibility for conduct which could be
found to be criminal in nature.
246 S.E.2d at 913. In light of that, the Mandolidis court held that conduct removed
from simple negligence was no longer entitled to protection under the workers'
compensation scheme:
The law of this jurisdiction recognizes a distinction between
negligence, including gross negligence, and wilful, wanton, and
reckless misconduct. The latter type of conduct requires a subjective
realization of the risk of bodily injury created by the activity and as
such does not constitute any form of negligence ....

In our view when death or injury results from wilful, wanton
or reckless misconduct such death or injury is no longer
accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and must be
taken as having been inflicted with deliberate intention for the
purposes of the workmen's compensation act.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the phrase "deliberate intent to
produce such injury or death" must be held to mean that an employer
loses immunity from common law actions where such employer's
conduct constitutes an intentional tort or wilful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct.
246 S.E.2d at 913-14 (emphasis added).
With these considerations, the Mandolidis court evaluated the two cases at
issue: one involving the removal of a safety guard from a saw at a furniture plant,
one involving a platform used in the construction of a bridge, and one - as here involving a miner's death in a roof fall. Id. at 914-920. The lower court dismissals
in· all three cases were reversed for further proceedings, in light of the court's
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consideration of the kind of conduct that would fall within "deliberate intent." Id.
Importantly, the Mandolidis court offered these considerations in the
evaluation of such cases, salient to the determination of this matter:
We are of the view that complicated industrial "accidents," wherein the
state of mind of company representatives is critical, seldom. lend
themselves to disposition by summary judgment, and where there is
any doubt such a motion should be refused. Conclusory affidavits
simply denying the existence of the requisite intent, obviously make no
contribution to the factual development of the litigated event and,
therefore, provide no assistance to the trial court in determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
246 S.E.2d at 918 (em.phases added); compare with Respondents' Brief, p. 29, n. 16

(quoting Bayer and Jordan declarations' identical pronouncements that "I did not
want to hurt anyone.")
The Mandolidis decision gave rise to what was known in West Virginia as a
Mandolidis action, the general test for which was as follows:
In the Syllabus of Kane v. Corning Glass Works, we restated the
burden the plaintiff bears in a Mandolidis action:
"Under Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., it is essential, in
order for an injured employee to recover, that the employer's
misconduct must be of an intentional or wilful, wanton and
reckless character, that the employer must have knowledge
and appreciation of the high degree of risk of physical harm. to
another created by such misconduct, and, of course, that the
employer's action must be the proximate cause of the injury."
Evidence of "wilful, wanton and reckless misconduct" which would
warrant a finding of "deliberate intent" must be "clear and forceful in
high degree."
Delp v. Itm.ann Coal Co., 176 W. Va. 252, 255, 342 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1986)(citations
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omitted). 14
In short, the Mareks do not doubt that Hecla can produce caselaw from other
jurisdictions, under other workers' compensation laws, stating that a specific intent
to injure is required for that state's exclusivity-exce ption. However, under Idaho's
law, the framework proposed by Justice Huntley in Kearney and apparently
approved of in Dominguez does not present an application of the law that is novel in
theory or practice. To the contrary, West Virginia's Mandolidis actions demonstrate
full enunciation and application of an exclusivity-exce ption that reaches more
broadly than bare criminal intent.

Mandolidis was ultimately superceded by statute, as explained by the Fourth
Circuit:
14

In 1978, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued a farreaching decision in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries[.] It ruled that
deliberate intention "must be held to mean that an employer loses
immunity from common law actions where such employer's conduct
constitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct." This holding stimulated much public debate and, in 1983,
the West Virginia Legislature amended the compensation statute with
the express intent of modifying the standard adopted in Mandolidis.
The statute now states that "in enacting the immunity provisions of
this chapter, the legislature intended to create a legislative standard
for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing
more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system
concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct."
Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 1986)(citations
omitted). The amended statute ultimately provided two alternative methods of
proving deliberate intent: first, where an employer acted with a "deliberately
formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death of any employee,"
and second, a multi-step test whereupon a "jury could infer a deliberate intent to
injure" predicated on the existence of "specific unsafe working condition." Id.; W.
Va. Code Ann. § 23-4-2.
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D.

Hecla's public policy concerns are overstated, as public policy is
better served by allowing suits such as the Mareks'.
Hecla also argues, broadly, that Kearney and DeMoss were correctly decided,

so as not to "disturb the balance between employees and employers that is inherent
in the worker's compensation system." (Respondents' Brief at 24-26.)
Heda's public policy argument attempts to weave a doomsday scenario where
"limits on litigation expenses" are undone, lawsuits against employers rise
dramatically, and summary judgment would be all but impossible.

(Id. at 26.)

These arguments amount to little more than hyperbole and speculation.
The Mareks cannot, of course, speak to the number of cases that might arise
were this Court to expressly confirm Justice Huntley's position in Kearney and
validate the underlying legal premise of Dominguez. However, the Mareks would
note that even in the years since those two cases (Kearney being issued in 1988),
there does not appear to have been any significant surge in exclusivity-exception
cases that have somehow overwhelmed Idaho's judiciary.
significant case -

Dominguez -

Instead, the most

involved the kind of heinous conduct and

catastrophic injury that would be the kind most appropriate for a Mandolidis-type
action (as the Mareks' case should be). In any event, if increased litigation served to
encourage employers to avoid the kind of reckless conduct that can lead to employee
deaths, then it could only be characterized as a successful advancement in Idaho's
workers' compensation law and the related public policy.
Hecla also complains that "[a]s a practical matter, in almost any tort case, a
plaintiff can alleged negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness." (Id.) Of course,
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our judicial system's process of discovery and summary judgment can weed out
meritless claims. But, as a more salient counterpoint, the Mareks note that Hecla
is actually advocating the opposite absurd position. That is, Hecla believes that an
employer's mere invocation of 'not wanting to hurt someone' instantly removes any
conduct

no matter how egregious - from the exclusivity exception.

See, e.g.,

Respondents' Brief, p. 29, n. 16 (quoting Bayer and Jordan declarations' identical
pronouncements that "I did not want to hurt anyone.").

Indeed, under Heda's

construction of the law, Allen Elias - who was sentenced to 17 years in federal
prison for his conduct - would have been able to wholly avoid the exclusivityexception with a single, one-sentence declaration that "I did not want to hurt Scott
Dominguez."15
Finally, as to Heda's argument that such cases would not be "easily resolved
without

trial,"

West

Virginia's

experience

at

least suggests

differently.16

(Respondents' Brief at 26.) While there are certainly meritorious cases that will
proceed to trial, non-meritorious cases will be filtered out in the summary judgment
process. Compare Mooney v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 17 4 W. Va. 350, 352, 326
15 And given Elias' objections to the jury instruction in his criminal matter which
provided that "The government does not need to show that the defendant actually
intended to harm or endanger any person," it certainly appears that he argued, or
intended to argue, that he meant no harm to Scott Dominguez. United States v.
Elias, 269 F.3d at 1018.
16 Notably, Mandolidis was developed by the supreme court of state where mining specifically, coal mining - was and is a critical component of their economy. So
much so, that the West Virginia state flag - like Idaho's - bears the image of a
miner. Concerns about how this may effect Idaho's mining industry - especially in
light of this particular action, a mining case - should be alleviated by West
Virginia's own movement into Mandolidis and the subsequent amendment of the
relevant exclusivity-exception statute to incorporate those principles.
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S.E.2d 427, 429 (1984)Gury verdict in Mandolidis action in favor of surviving spouse
of miner killed in roof-fall affirmed) with Chambers v. Sovereign Coal Corp., 170 W.
Va. 537, 538-40, 295 S.E.2d 28, 29-31 (1982)(summary judgment decision affirmed
in case involving employee killed when crane he was using struck power line). Even

if a Mandolidis-type matter proceeded to trial, the usual tools of directed verdict
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are available to the courts.

See, e.g.,

Delp v. Itmann Coal Co., 342 S.E.2d at 222-23 (directed verdict against employee
affirmed); Dreyer v. Weirton Steel, Div. of Nat. Steel Corp., 178 W. Va. 540, 542543, 363 S.E.2d 127, 129-130 (1986)(iudgmen t notwithstanding the verdict against
employee affirmed).
Accordingly, Heda's public policy concerns are overstated. Instead, public
policy - especially that underpinning Idaho's workers' compensation laws - is
advanced by confirming that actions such as the Mareks' fit within Idaho's
exclusivity-exce ption.

Workers'

compensation

laws,

"designed

to

remove

[n]egligently caused industrial accidents from the common law tort system,"
should not be construed to as to work "an injustice on persons injured as a result of
conduct which is so likely to produce injury or death that its performance, under all
circumstances, could perhaps warrant criminal liability." 246 S.E.2d at 911 & 913.
On this point, Hecla simply re-argues its position that Kearney and DeMoss
require a specific "intent to injure," such that facts presented by the Mareks
regarding "whether Defendants received warnings that the mining practices were
dangerous and whether it was necessary for the chief engineer to approve the
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mining plan" were not material for the purpose of summary judgment. (C.R. 973.)
As discussed above, however, these precise facts sufficiently establish Heda's
knowledge and conduct for the purpose of granting judgment in favor of the Mareks.
Alternatively, at a minimum, such "disputed" facts should have precluded summary
judgment being granted in favor of Hecla.
As a related aside, why these particular facts matter, and how they fit into
excepting this case from Idaho's workers' compensation scheme, can be illustrated
by a recent West Virginia case, under its narrower, post-Mandolidis law.

In

Reynolds v. Consol of Kentucky, Inc., the Southern District of West Virginia
weighed whether a mining fatality came within the "deliberate intent" exception to
West Virginia's workers' compensation laws.17 See 2010 WL 3522130 (S.D.W. Va.
Sept. 8, 2010).

That matter was examined under the provision addressing "unsafe

working condition[s]" that are known to the employer - much like the "unsafe
working environment" discussed by Justice Huntley in his Kearney concurrence.
The Reynolds case concerned a miner killed in an underground mine roof
collapse.

Id. at *I.

The Reynolds court ultimately rejected application of the

exception, but did so on critical safety facts not present in the Mareks' case. The
Court explained:
Every Consol employee who examined the roof in the area where the
17 W. Va. Code §23-4-2. West Virginia's current statutory provisions (amended postMandolidis, as discussed above) regarding the exclusivity exception are notably far
more verbose and detailed than Idaho's currently are. These statutory provisions
fold in (and arguably narrow) the Mandolidis principles, and include both an
express specific intent to injure exception, and an express provision regarding
"unsafe working condition[s]" known to the employer. (Id.)
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accident occurred concluded that the roof was safe and secure on
September 3, 2007.
The record is completely devoid of evidence that Consol knew that the
roof in the No. 4 panel presented a strong probability of serious injury
or death. Indeed, the evidence is just the opposite. Shawn Johnson, the
continuous miner operator who Brent Reynolds relieved, stated that
when he was working on the No. 4 entry he "didn't see [him]self in any
immediate danger. If I would have I wouldn't have been there."
Johnson Depo. at 13 ("Now, if I would have thought we had a
condition, a dangerous condition, you know, I would have looked for
more support or anything, but I didn't feel that we were in any
immediate danger there."). Richard Wiley, a roof bolter working in the
area stated that the roof there "was pretty good. Actually, that section
right there was a pretty good section." Deposition of Richard Wiley,
July 17, 2009, at 10 (Exhibit 6 to Defendant's Motion; Exhibit N to
Plaintiffs Memo.). Ron Yates, Reynold's co-worker agreed: "Everything
looked all right. Everything looked good. I didn't see anything out of
the ordinary. No reason why we couldn't start mining coal." Yates
Depo. at 10. Because plaintiff cannot show that Consol had actual
knowledge that the transition zone at issue presented a high
probability of death or injury to Brent Reynolds, her deliberate intent
claim must fail.

Id. at *2 & 7. The Reynolds court went on to explain how there was no evidence
that the employer had failed its inspection duties, either:
In Ryan [v. Clonch Indus., Inc., 636 S.E.2d 756 (W.Va. 2006)], the
employer admitted that it had failed to conduct a mandatory hazard
inspection which would have revealed the unsafe working condition
resulting in injury. Id. at 762-66. The Ryan court refused to allow the
employer to deny actual knowledge holding that
where the defendant employer has failed to perform a
reasonable evaluation to identify hazards in the workplace in
violation of a statute, rule or regulation imposing a mandatory
duty to perform the same, the performance of which may have
readily identified certain workplace hazards, the defendant
employer is prohibited from denying that it possessed "a
subjective realization" of the hazard asserted in the deliberate
intent action, and the employee, upon demonstrating such
violation, is deemed to have satisfied his or her burden of proof
with respect to showing "subjective realization" pursuant to W.
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Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2(ii)(B).

Id. at 766. This case is distinguishable from Ryan as there 1s no
evidence Consol failed to carry out its inspection duties.
The No. 4 panel existed at least seven months prior to the accident on
September 3, 2007. Deposition of Thomas Charles, November 5, 2009,
at 51 (Exhibit A to Defendant's Reply Brief). During that time, both
the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MHSA") and the
West Virginia Office of Miners' Health Safety and Training
("WVOMHST") examined and inspected the area quarterly. Id. at 52,
55, and 106, 639 S.E.2d 756. Adequacy of the roof and roof control
measures were a part of this inspection process and Consol was never
issued a citation because of roof problems in the No. 4 panel prior to
the accident.

(Id. at *7-8 & n.1)

In this matter, those facts that the Reynolds court placed

particular emphasis on - no concern amongst the miners, regular inspections
including control considerations, a long-existing roof, etc. - are not present in this
action. Instead, the facts in this matter demonstrate precisely the opposite:
•

No engineer review and approval was secured. (Appellants Mareks' Brief-inChief at 28-30.) Heda's Chief Engineer proclaimed, "You gotta be fucking
kidding me" on seeing the stope map post-collapse (C.R. 534, 11. 18:15-16),
and testified that he would not have approved the cuts without a tested,
designed, engineered ground support plan (C.R. 535, 11. 24:24-25:2.)

•

The cut was greater than had ever been done before in the mine, despite
Hecla having no rock mechanics engineer and asking no outside consultant to
evaluate the pillar removal. (C.R. 717-718, 11. 13:18-14:13; 511, 11. 72:6-21;
451, 11. 39: 12-40:23; 659, 11. 32:25-33:2; 693, 11. 14:14-15:5; & 725, 11. 43:13-18.)

•

Hecla' s Safety Foreman had no role in the decision to remove the pillars, and
did not review the plans in advance of removing the pillar. (C.R. 551-554, 11.
19:25-23:22; 25:25-27:4; 29:12-30:24.) This was despite the fact that the stope
was ultimately blasted even wider than intended, but no additional support
was installed or even considered. (C.R. 453-454, 11. 49:10-50:17; 517, 11. 96:412.)

•

Hecla was specifically warned, on multiple occasions, by a production
geologist about the dangers in removing the pillars. (C.R. 242-243, 11. 151:15-

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRJEF - 33

152:24; 244-246, 11. 153:6-155:4; & 402-407.)
-•

Hecla was warned by a "Sugar Daddy" (high-senior ity) miner about problems
with the pillar removal. (C.R. 572, II. 13:5-14:24; 602-603, II. 132:4-135:3.)

•

Despite these overwhelmi ng safety issues and warnings, the Mareks were
still placed directly into danger by being ordered to work in the stope,
performing work within their normal scope of duties. (See generally C.R. 835841; 618, 11. 23:8-18; 593-594, 11. 97:25-98:9; 636, II. 35:4-37:12; 647-649; 123124, II. 32:25-33:3; 884-885, 11. 309:21-310:18; 512-513, 11. 77:13-79:12; 636, 11.
34:1-25 & 36:19-37:12; 618, 11. 23:8-18; 594, 11. 98:5-9; & 608, II. 155:2-156:11.)

Further, as compared to Reynolds, where MSHA was involved in the inspection of
the impacted areas in the months prior to the roof fall, MSHA here roundly
sanctioned Hecla following the collapse, including:
•

Citations by MSHA relating to the removal of pillars, which MSHA found to
be an "unwarrant able failure to comply with a mandatory standard." (E.g.,
C.R. 408-413.)

•

A Decision and Order in the MSHA Civil Penalty Proceeding against Hecla
(R. Adden. 8-26)("MSHA Order"), which imposed significant penalties against
Hecla for its actions in undercuttin g the pillars. Importantly , the MSHA
Order highlighted Heda's knowledge: ""I find that the violation was the
result of Heda's reckless disregard and unwarranta ble failure to comply with
the safety standard .... Managemen t knew that (1) fractures and faults were
often present in the host rock; (2) miners were going to undercut the pillars
for a [sic] considerable distances; (3) undercuttin g pillars for significant
distances was not a typical practice in the Gold Hunter section of the mine,
and (4) no engineering study or any other study had been undertaken to
determine whether its ground support plan would adequately support the
roof under such conditions." (R. Adden. 19 & 24.)

In short, these facts matter. The bare flaunting of federal safety laws and workers'
lives for the sake of a few extra dollars in ore are what separate this case from cases
involving, e.g., a missing lawnmower attachment (Kearney) or missing safety
equipment before asbestos testing of a boiler's insulation. (DeMoss). These facts
demonstrate the "employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe
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working environment" that Justice Huntley warned about in Kearney. As such,
they appropriately provide a basis to grant summary judgment to the Mareks and
to -deny summary judgment in Heda's favor. Accordingly, the District Court erred
in holding there were no material facts in dispute, and the District Court's decision
should be reversed.

E.

Hecla should have borne the burden on summary judgment.
Hecla argues that the Mareks "confuse the ultimate burden on the merits

with the burden at summary judgment." (Respondents' Brief at 26.) This argument
fails.
First, the law 1s clear: "a nonmoving defendant has the burden of
supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for summary judgment."
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491 (2009) (emphasis
added). Hecla bore the burden of proof on summary judgment on its affirmative
defense, not the Mareks.
Second, as to why this is important, Hecla argues that, "from either point of
view," the exclusivity-exception is inapplicable because "Defendants introduced
evidence that they had no intent to injure the Mareks." (Respondents' Brief at 29.)
Of course, in so arguing, they point only to the Bayer and Jordan declarations'
identical pronouncements that "I did not want to hurt anyone."

(Respondents'

Brief, p. 29, n. 16.) Arguing that the burden then shifts to the Mareks - without
addressing the MSHA violations, the lack of engineering review, the lack of safety
review, the lack of ground support, the disregard for warnings, etc. - simply doesn't
comport with the appropriate burden to be placed on Hecla. That is, demonstrating
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- at least in the summary judgment context - that this case was not a case of an
"employer's knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working environment."
As such, Heda's argument on this point fails.is

F.

The District Court erred in holding that Respondents Baker, Jordan,
Bayer, Hogamier, Moore, and Stepro were fellow servants immune
from suit under I.C. §72-209.
Hecla asserts that the District Court correctly held that the individual

defendants are immune under Idaho Code §72-209, for the same reasons that
summary judgment was granted to Hecla.

(Respondents' Brief, at 31.)

Hecla

asserts no other grounds for such immunity.
Accordingly, for the same reasons that summary judgment in favor of Hecla
should be reversed, so should summary judgment in favor of the individual
defendants be reversed.

G.

The Mareks' Motion for Reconsideration should have been granted.
1.

The District Court appropriately heard the Mareks' Motion to
Reconsider.

Hecla contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Marek's
Motion to Reconsider, arguing that the Marek's Motion for Reconsideration did not
state with particularity the basis for the motion. (Respondents' Brief, at 31-32.) In
particular, Hecla asserts that the motion was untimely per I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). (Id.)

1s "In making its argument, Hecla also makes the illogical leap that, because the

Mareks pursued worker's compensation claims (one of which, Mike Marek's, was
resisted by Hecla), the Mareks then bore the burden on summary judgment. Such a
contention is refuted by this Court's own pronouncement on burden, discussed
above. Further, as seen in Dominguez, it is not inconsistent for an injured worker to
seek workers' compensation benefits and pursue remedies under the exclusivityexception.
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Here, the summary judgment decision at issue was issued on April 21, 2015,
with the formal Judgment later issuing on May 5, 2014. (C.R. 977 & 990.) The
Marek's Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 29, 2015, well within the
time period allowed under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).I9 (R. Adden., at 1.) The motion
identified both the rule under which the motion was made, and the particular order
for which reconsideration as being sought:
COME NOW the plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, by and
through their undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B), and hereby move this Court for
reconsideration of its ruling as set forth in the Memorandum Decision
and Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed April
21, 2015.
This motion will be based upon a supporting memorandum and
affidavits filed in accord with the time requirements of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, as well as all other pleadings and papers on file in
this action.
(R: Adden., at 2.) Accordingly, this satisfies the requirements of Rule 7, and the
District Court appropriately heard the Marek's Motion for Reconsideration.
In any event, the Mareks subsequently submitted their supporting
memorandum on August 4, 2015, 14 days in advance of the August 18, 2015
hearing.20

(R. Adden., at 27; Transcript, August 18, 2015 ("2nd Tr.").)

This

memorandum further outlined the facts and authority underpinning the motion, as
I9 I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) provides, in relevant part, "(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A
motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14)
days after the entry of the final judgment."
20 As explained at hearing, the lag between the motion and hearing was due, in
part, to the difficulty in securing hearing dates in light of Judge Simpson's
retirement. (2nd Tr., 11. 6:22-7:7.)
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is common practice in Idaho. See, e.g., Nava v. Rivas-Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 862,
264 P.3d 960, 969 (2011) ("When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party must notify the opposing party of the particular grounds for the motion. The
motion must 'state with particularity the grounds therefor including the number of
the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief
or order sought.' Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b)(l). Typically, parties moving for

summary judgment merely state the relief or order sought in the motion,
and then state with particularity the grounds for the motion in a
supporting memorandum.")(emph asis added). Moreover, even where the District
Co_urt may find the memorandum to be untimely or late, the District Court has
discretion to hear the motion.

See, e.g., I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(D); accord, Marcher v.

Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 869 (1988)("Butler is correct that a movant who neither
requests oral argument nor submits written briefs may find that its motion has
been denied by the trial court without notice. The rules grant such discretion. . ..
Rule 7 only says that the court may dismiss the motion without notice, and clearly
does not require this, and does not even establish a time frame in which filed
motions must be noticed up for argument. [I]t is equally within the trial court's
discretion to permit written or oral argument, .... "). As Hecla merely argues a lack
of discretion, rather than any abuse of discretion, Heda's argument fails.
Finally, Hecla also argues that, if filed as something other than a motion for
reconsideration, the Mareks' Motion for Reconsideration was beyond the jurisdiction
of the District Court, per IAR 13(b). (Respondents' Brief at 32-33.) The Court can
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disregard this argument, as the Mareks do not contend that their expressly-named
Motion for Reconsideration was anything other than a motion for reconsideration.

2.

The District Court erred in denying the Mareks' Motion for
Reconsideration of the District Court's summary judgment
decision.

Hecla asserts that the District Court did not err in its ruling on the Mareks'
Motion for Reconsideration, and in particular, its rulings on summary judgment
burden, the Mareks' scope of work, and the MSHA Decision.
a.

Hecla bore the burden of proof on summary judgment.

As to the issue of burden, Hecla points to a fleeting, speculative musing by
the Court otherwise holding that the Mareks had the burden on summary
judgment, that "Hecla clearly met any initial burden it had pleading the affirmative
defense, by presenting a record that shows there is no willful or unprovoked
physical aggression."

(2nd Tr., 26:1-3.)

More correctly, the Court prefaced this

statement as follows:
I think the clear law in Kearney is the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to bring their facts within the exception, to put forth evidence
that shows that the death was proximally caused by unprovoked
physical aggression of the employer.
The MSHA administrative district judge, although I don't believe I'm
bound by that person's findings, did not get to a willful act, did not get
to any physical aggression.
Even if the Court were to entertain the plaintiffs' motion or the
plaintiffs' position that the burden initially is on the defense to
establish a prima facie case of its affirmative defense on the facts at
bar, the things I can consider in this case, I can get to negligence, I can
get to maybe some sort of aggravated negligence, but I can't get beyond
negligence. There just aren't facts that bring this case within the
exception.
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. Tr. 25:6-25:24)(emphases added).

Here, the District Court continued to

improperly place the burden on the Mareks on summary judgment.

Indeed, 1n

musing how Heda's evidence might meet an initial burden, the District Court then
failed to discuss the Mareks' opposing evidence - evidence which the Court had
already recognized as "disputed facts." (C.R. 973.)
b.

The Mareks were acting appropriately within their scope of
work.

Hecla also asserts that the District Court correctly held that the scope of
work assignment for the Mareks was "irrelevant." (Respondents' Brief at 33.)

In

particular, the District Court focused on the question of "was there express direction
to go in there which amounted to willful or unprovoked physical aggression" as the
"test." (2nd Tr., 11. 26:13-19.) The District Court explained, more fully:
With regard to the argument by the plaintiffs that the general duty
assignment to that stope was sufficient to constitute an authorization
that they be in there watering the muck, I think that's true, but
that's not the test. As Mr. Ramsden points out, was there express
direction to go in there which amounted to willful or unprovoked
physical aggression?
(Jd.)(emphasis added). The District Court also summarized what it considered the
key facts of the Dominguez case:
The physical aggression was, get in there and clean the cyanide,
knowing of the violations, meeting the protests of the employees, with
just ignoring the requirements for respirators and safety gear. That's
why that case had so many decisions and so many forums. It was just
very, very egregious conduct.
(2nd Tr., 11. 26:6-12.) Each of those key facts highlighted by the District Court echo
the facts of this case:
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•

"[G]et in there and clean the cyanide"21
As above, the District Court
indicated that "I think that's true" that "the general duty assignment to that
stope was sufficient to constitute an authorization that they be in there
watering the muck" - in an area that without engineering review, without
safety review, without ground control, and in violation of federal mining laws.

•

"[K]nowing of the violations" 22 -Again, as above, the violations involved were
"mandatory standard[s]" (C.R. 408-413), the violations for which were
deemed "unwarrantable" by l\t[SHA. (Id.)

•

"[M]eeting the protests of the employees" - Testimony provided in deposition
demonstrated that Hecla received multiple warnings about the stope from a
production geologist and a "Sugar Daddy" miner. (C.R. 242-243, 11. 151:15152:24; 244-245, 11. 153:6-155:4; 402-407; 572, 11. 13:5-14:24; & 602-603, 11.
132:4-135:3.)

•

"[W]ith just ignoring the requirements for respirators and safety gear." -And
here, the requirements ignored related to ground control, and in particular,
that it "was not designed, installed and/or maintained in a manner that was
capable of supporting the ground in such a wide stope when the support
pillar was removed." (C.R. 408 & 412.)

Thus, especially in light of the Dominguez decision, the District Court erred 1n
concluding that the scope of work question was irrelevant.
C.

Heda's hearsay argument as to the MSHA Decision fails.

Finally, Hecla asserts both that the District Court appropriately disregarded
the MSHA Decision in light of Kearney and DeMoss, but also that the District Court
found the MSHA Decision "inadmissible hearsay." (Respondents' Brief, at 34.) As
21 More correctly, "Dominguez alleges Elias knew it was hazardous to enter the steel
tank, but concealed that knowledge from Dominguez." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9.
22 Elias, the employer in the Dominguez case, was convicted of violations of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, where "the indictment charged that Elias
had stored or disposed of hazardous waste without a permit, knowing that his
actions placed others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury[.]"
United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d at 1008. As above, the mens rea element of the
offense did not require proof that Elias "actually intended to harm or endanger any
person." Id. at 1018.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 41

to the first issue, as discussed above, the District Court erred in not recognizing
that the MSHA Decision outlined the kind of conduct warned of by Justice Huntley
an_d otherwise punished in Dominguez.
As to the hearsay issue, to the contrary, no such hearsay ruling was made; in
fact, the District Court's oral decision is devoid of any reference to hearsay.23 (2nd
Tr., 11. 24:21-28:7.) Further, Heda's opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
contains no hearsay objection to the MSHA Decision (R. Adden., 44-45), nor was any
such objection raised by Hecla at hearing.

(2nd Tr., 11. 20:15-24:15.)

Hearsay

objections made for the first time on appeal are not properly before the Court and
"will not be considered."

Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271 (Ct. App.

1982). 24 Accordingly, Heda's argument on this point fails.

23

This argument appears to be based on the Court's fleeting comment that
"although I don't believe I'm bound by that person's findings [the "MSHA
administrative district judge"] .... " [2nd Tr., 11. 25:13-14.] This appears to be only
passing commentary on potential preclusion issues, as the District Court ultimately
did. make discussion of the MSHA decision findings. As an aside, Idaho allows for
res judicata (both issue and claim preclusion) to apply with respect to
administrative determinations. See J &J Contractors v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 118
Idaho 535, 537, 797 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1990); Transport Truck & Trailer Inc. v.
Freightliner, LLC, 368 Fed. Appx. 786, at *1 (9th Cir. 2010)(unpublished).
24

In any event, other courts have found MSHA evidence to be admissible. See, e.g.,
Kennedy v. Joy Techs., Inc., 269 F. App'x 302, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2008)(unpublished);
Lupardus v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. CIV.A. 2:06-CV-00661, 2007 WL 2156606, at
*3 (S.D.W. Va. July 26, 2007); Smith v. Atl. Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th
Cir. 1987). Moreover, under I.RE. 803(8), the MSHA Decision would not be a
"special investigation," because MSHA is required by law to investigate and control
every such incident, and, in conjunction therewith, provide such information to state
agencies and the public, per 30 U.S.C. § 819(b). Compare with Jeremiah v. Yanke
Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242, 247, 953 P.2d 992, 997 (1998)(contrasting
admissibility of medication distribution chart required by Federal Drug
Administration versus Idaho Human Rights Commission determination of a
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For these reasons, the District Court's denial of the Marek's Motion for
Reconsideration should be reversed.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the April 21, 2015, decision of the District
Court granting summary judgment to Hecla, and, in turn, denying the Mareks'
motion for summary judgment, as well as the District Court's September 3, 2015,
denial of the Mareks' motion for reconsideration, should be reversed and remanded
to the District Court.
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"particular complaint" "not submitted to any other federal or state agency pursuant
to a duty imposed by law.").
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